Abstract We consider a queueing system with multiple heterogeneous servers serving a multiclass population. The classes are distinguished by the time costs. All customers have i.i.d. service requirements. Arriving customers do not see the instantaneous queue occupancy. Arrivals are randomly routed to one of the servers and the routing probabilities are determined centrally to optimize the expected waiting cost. This is, in general, a difficult optimization problem and we obtain the structure of the routing matrix. Next we consider a system in which each queue charges an admission price. The arrivals are routed randomly to minimize an individual objective function that includes the expected waiting cost and the admission price. Once again, we obtain the structure of the equilibrium routing matrix for this case. Finally, we determine the admission prices to make the equilibrium routing probability matrix equal to a given optimal routing probability matrix.
waiting for service or being served, and then depart. Customer classes differ in their aversion to some metric based on waiting time, delay or congestion in the queue. We seek to determine how customers may be assigned to servers in such a way as to optimize some social welfare function, and also how pricing may be used to incentivize selfish customers to achieve the same social optimum.
Examples of such systems include web server farms, cloud and grid computing clusters, communication networks and cognitive radio systems. In these examples, customers may differ in the quality of service they require, and in their willingness to pay for it. The quality of service of a customer may depend on the share of bandwidth or other resources it receives, or the service latency or the sojourn time in the system. Our modeling framework is quite general in this regard. Other examples encompassed by our framework include transport networks, which may comprise parallel tolled and toll-free highways or multiple modes of transport, and healthcare systems.
We capture customer requirements or preferences in the form of a cost function based on the occupancy, delay or waiting time in the system. We distinguish between customer classes by applying suitable multipliers to these costs. Defining a social objective of minimizing the sum of customer costs, we study properties of socially optimal allocations. Next, we consider selfish customers who route themselves so as to optimize their individual expected utility. In this setting, we allow each server to charge a fixed, class-independent, admission price to each customer using it, and model the interaction between customers as a game. We study properties of the Nash equilibria of this game, which are termed Wardrop equilibria in this context. Finally, we ask if there exist admission prices for which the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the socially optimal routing.
Our main contributions are as follows. We characterize certain structural properties possessed by the socially optimal routing policy, and show for arbitrary prices that the Wardrop equilibrium also has a similar structure. We then show that we can indeed set prices so that the resulting Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the social optimum, and that these prices admit an interpretation as Pigouvian taxes associated with congestion externalities at the servers.
Previous Work
There is a substantial literature in queueing theory on the allocation of multiclass customers to parallel queues in both centralized and decentralized settings, including a variety of pricing schemes and game-theoretic formulations. Below, we describe some of the work more closely related to the approach taken in this paper. We use Kendall's notation for queueing models throughout.
[3] studied a single traffic class served by a set of parallel M/G/1 queues and showed that the socially optimal allocation differs from the Wardrop equilibrium obtained when customers individually and selfishly choose which queue to join. Restricting their attention to parallel M/M/1 queues, [9] obtained an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy, defined as the ratio of the total cost at the Wardrop equilibrium to that at the social optimum.
[5] studied the probabilistic allocation of multiclass traffic to parallel M/G/1 queues so as to minimize a specific social cost function, namely the total mean waiting cost per unit of time. He characterized the structure of the optimal solution. [16] considered a variant in which each queue could choose the order in which customers within it were served. They showed that it is best to prioritize customers of higher classes, and formulated the optimal routing problem under this service discipline. They could not solve the routing problem explicitly, but showed that it had an interior solution. The structure we obtain for our optimal routing is essentially the same as in [5] , but our results apply to a very general class of queueing models and cost functions, and we also consider a game-theoretic setting of selfish optimization. Unlike [16] , servers cannot discriminate between classes in our model, which may be more realistic depending on the application.
In some applications, it is natural to associate a dispatcher with each class that seeks to allocate customers of that class to servers in such a way as to minimize their expected waiting time. This setting, with M/G/1-processor sharing queues, is studied in [2, 1] ; the authors obtain bounds on the price of anarchy in the resulting game.
The use of admission prices to reduce congestion was studied by [13] and [8] . Customers, who belong to a single class, have to choose between paying an admission price to enter the queue, incurring a delay cost and receiving a fixed reward for service, or balking (leaving without being served). Admission prices are set by an operator who seeks to maximize revenue. If customers can observe the queue length on arrival and base their balking decision on it, then the revenue maximizing admission price exceeds the one that maximizes social welfare ( [13] ). However, if customers cannot observe the queue and have to base their decision on only the known arrival and service rates, then these two admission prices coincide ( [8] ). More recently, there have been a number of papers proposing the use of differentiated prices in the Internet and studying the resultant user strategies and equilibria. Some of these notable ones are [14, 10, 7, 4] .
Model and problem formulation
We consider a system with M classes of customers and N queues. Class m customers arrive according to a Poisson process of rate λ m , independent of other classes. The allocation of arriving customers to queues has to be made with no knowledge of current or past queue occupancies, or past arrival times or routing decisions. (It goes without saying that the future is also unknown.) Such an assumption may be less realistic for centralized allocation than when customers have to make individual decisions. Nevertheless, imposing this assumption uniformly permits clearer comparison of the two settings. Under this assumption, it is natural to restrict attention to Markovian routing policies, i.e., to policies which route customers of class i to queue j with some fixed probability p ij . This is also the class of policies considered in [5, 16] . Under Markovian routing, the aggregate arrival process into queue j is a Poisson process of rate
We assume that customers of all classes have the same job size distributions, and that, once they join a queue, they are treated identically within it. Associated with queue j is a cost function D j (·) that specifies a cost associated with a given aggregate arrival rate. For example, the cost could be the mean sojourn time, or some higher moment of it, or the probability of the sojourn time exceeding a specified threshold. Our only assumption is that each function D j be monotone increasing, and continuously differentiable in the interior of its domain (the set of arrival rates for which D j is finite), with strictly positive derivative. Finally, with each class i, we associate a positive parameter β i that quantifies its sensitivity to delay or congestion by multiplying the cost incurred by a class i customer by β i . The only distinction between classes is in applying different multipliers β i to their costs in any queue. Without loss of generality, we take β 1 > β 2 > . . . > β M ; if β i = β j , we can collapse them into a single class, as customers are otherwise assumed to be identical.
The assumptions above are rather mild. We do not restrict the number of servers at a queue or the service discipline. Indeed, different queues may have different numbers of servers and employ different service disciplines. They can also employ different cost functions, for example the mean sojourn time at one queue and the second moment at another. The only requirement is that each queue treat all customers alike, irrespective of their class. In addition to traditional queueing models, our set-up also encompasses transport models for example, where the mean journey time on a road may be some function of the traffic intensity on it. The main motivation for the assumption of Poisson arrivals is that it makes the D j functions of a single real variable. It is not obvious how the monotonicity and differentiability assumptions would generalize if D j were to be a function of the law of a stochastic process.
We are now ready to state the social welfare maximization problem. The objective is
where the infimum is taken over all right stochastic matrices P (defined as matrices with non-negative entries whose row sums are unity), and the γ j depend on P through (1), though this dependence has not been made explicit in the notation. Thus, the social cost is defined as the sum of the expected costs incurred by customers of different classes at different queues, weighted by the corresponding flow rates.
Next, we consider the formulation of a game between customers. Here, we allow the queues to charge admission prices, denoted by c j at queue j. Without loss of generality, we take c 1 > c 2 > . . . > c N ; if c i = c j , then we can collapse these two queues into a single queue whose delay function is the inf-convolution of the delay functions of its constituent queues, i.e.,
The goal of a class i customer entering the system is to choose a queue j so as to minimize c j + β i D j (γ j ) where γ j is determined through the strategies of all customers. We assume that the rates λ 1 , . . . , λ M , the cost functions D j (·) and the parameters β i , i = 1, . . . , M and c j , j = 1, . . . , N are all common knowledge. Under the additional assumptions, noted earlier, that a customer doesn't have access to current or past queue occupancies, or the history of arrival times or decisions, its strategy is necessarily restricted to choosing a server according to a fixed probability distribution, albeit one that may depend on its class. Thus, again, the joint strategies may be represented by a right stochastic routing matrix, P. We recall the condition for such a routing matrix P to be a Wardrop equilibrium:
In words, the condition says that if a customer has positive probability of using a queue, then its expected cost in that queue must be no higher than its expected cost in any other queue. In particular, if a customer has positive probability of using both queues j and k, then the above inequality must hold in both directions, Hence, the expected total cost in the two queues is equal in this case. A Wardrop equilibrium is simply a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and hence is guaranteed to exist. We describe the structure of a matrix P * solving the welfare optimization problem (2) in Section 3. In Section 4, we show that a solution P W of (3) also has a similar structure, for any admission prices. We then show how to choose the admission prices so as to make P W coincide with P * , and illustrate our general results with a numerical example. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of some open problems.
Social Welfare Optimization
Consider the optimization problem (2) . As the maps P → γ j and D j are continuous, the problem is one of minimizing a continuous function over the compact set of right stochastic matrices. Hence, there is a matrix P * achieving the infimum. We will now characterize some properties of the matrix P * below.
Theorem 1 Let P * achieve the minimum in (2) and let γ * denote the arrival rates corresponding to P * , as given by (1). Consider two customer classes i 1 < i 2 , so that β i1 > β i2 . Suppose j 1 and j 2 are distinct queues such that i 1 uses j 1 and i 2 uses j 2 , i.e., p * i1,j1 > 0 and p *
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. To lighten notation, we shall write β 1 , λ 1 for β i1 , λ i1 . We write p 11 for p i1,j1 , p m1 for p m,j1 , D * 1 for D 1 (γ * j1 ) and so on.
Suppose first that D * 1 > D * 2 . For sufficiently small ǫ > 0, it is clear that we can find a routing matrix P such that
and all other elements of P are the same as the corresponding elements of P * . In words, we have shifted a quantity ǫ of the flow of class i 1 customers from queue j 1 to queue j 2 , and an equal quantity of class i 2 customers from j 2 to j 1 , leaving all others unaffected. Clearly, the total flow rates γ under P are exactly the same as γ * . Consequently, we can compute the change in social cost as
Consider the routing matrix P described above, and define the matrices P α = αP + (1 − α)P * . Then P α is a right stochastic matrix for all α ∈ [0, 1] and it assigns non-zero amounts of class i 1 and class i 2 traffic to each of the queues j 1 and j 2 . By the same argument as above, the total flow rates γ α induced by P α are the same as γ * . Moreover, U (P α ) = U (P * ) as P α only differs from P * in changing the composition of traffic at two queues j 1 and j 2 of equal cost, while keeping the total flows unchanged. Hence, P α also achieves the minimum in (2) . We now apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality at P α , where p 11 , p 12 , p 21 and p 22 are all strictly between 0 and 1. (The regularity conditions needed for the KKT necessary conditions to be applicable hold because the constraints on P * are affine.) The KKT conditions imply that
.
Using the definitions of U and γ j , we can rewrite the first equality above as
where we write (D ′ are constant for any α ∈ (0, 1). Denoting these by η 1 and η 2 respectively, we obtain that
for all α ∈ (0, 1). But this is impossible because the D ′ are non-zero by assumption, one of p
Hence, it is also not possible for D * 1 and D * 2 to be equal. This completes the proof of the theorem.
⊓ ⊔ We now use Theorem 1 to establish a structural property of any optimal allocation of customers to queues, i.e., of any solution of (2).
Corollary 1 Suppose P * solves the optimization problem (2), and let γ * j denote the resulting flow rates, as given by (1) . Consider a re-ordering of the queues such that
Moreover, for each n i , either p i,ni or p i+1,ni or both are strictly positive.
1
In words, the corollary says that each customer class uses a nearly dedicated set of queues in the above ordering, with a possible overlap only at the boundaries of the sets. Note that it is possible for more than two classes of customers to use the same queue. For example, if n 1 = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 , then customer classes 2 and 3 certainly use this queue (as they have nowhere else to go), while customer classes 1 and 4 may or may not do so. It is possible to have n M < N, in which case there are some queues that aren't used by any customer class. This would be the case if, even at zero load, the delay in these queues is larger than in the alternatives. Proof. Let P * solve the welfare optimization problem (2) . Define Q i = {j : p * ij > 0} to be the set of queues used by class i under P * , and order these queues in non-decreasing order of delays. Clearly, each Q i is non-empty. Define
, with equality only if the same queue j attains the maximum in the first case and the minimum in the second. Moreover, in this case, every queue
The claim of the corollary is now obvious.
⊓ ⊔ We now turn to the question of the computational complexity of finding the optimal allocation P * . Despite the nice structure of the optimal allocation provided by Corollary 1, it is far from obvious whether there is a polynomial time algorithm to find the optimal allocation, or even the ordering of queues at the optimal allocation. If the welfare optimization problem (2) were convex, then standard interior point methods would be able to find an optimal allocation in polynomial time. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as the following counterexample illustrates.
Consider a system with two classes of customers and 2 queues i.e. M = N = 2. Class i customers arrive according to a stationary Poisson process of rate λ i while the service times for both classes are i.i.d. exponential with unit mean. Both servers have a unit service rate. We also assume that λ 1 + λ 2 < 1 and β 1 > β 2 . The arrivals of class i are routed to queue j with probability p ij , independent of the routing of other customers. Since p i1 = 1 − p i2 , U (·) may be seen to be a function of only (p 11 , p 21 ) taking values in [0, 1] 2 . To simplify notation, we will use p 1 = p 11 and p 2 = p 21 . The total arrival rate into the two queues is given by
Since the the arrivals are Poisson, the routing is a Bernoulli sampling of the arrivals and the service time is exponential, each of the two queues is an M/M/1 queue with D j (γ j ) = 1/(1 − γ j ). Therefore the social cost is
The partial derivative of the social cost U (p 1 , p 2 ) with respect to p 1 is given by
Take p 1 = p 2 = 1/2. Then, γ 1 = γ 2 . As the functions D 1 and D 2 are identical, being the delays at identical ·/M/1 queues, hence so are their derivatives, and it is easy to see that ∂U (p 1 , p 2 )/∂p 1 = 0 at (1/2, 1/2). Similarly, ∂U (p 1 , p 2 )/∂p 2 is also zero at this point, and it follows that the social cost function has zero gradient at (1/2, 1/2). If U (·, ·) were a convex function, it would follow that (1/2, 1/2) is a global minimizer. We shall show that this is not the case, and hence that U cannot be a convex function.
Observe from (4) and (5) that γ 1 + γ 2 = λ 1 + λ 2 , and that
. Now, (1/2, 1/2) ∈ L 1 , so, if the global minimum of U (p 1 , p 2 ) is attained at (1/2, 1, 2), then it is also attained at every point on L 1 . Hence, the gradient of U , if it exists, should be zero at every point on L 1 . We show that this is not the case.
Since
, and the functions D 1 and D 2 are identical, we see from (6) that
is strictly positive by assumption, so the only way that the partial derivative could be zero on L 1 is if (2p 1 − 1)β 1 λ 1 + (2p 2 − 1)β 2 λ 2 is identically zero on the set L 1 . But L 1 is specified as the set on which γ 1 = γ 2 , which, by (4) implies that (2p 1 − 1)λ 1 + (2p 2 − 1)λ 2 is identically zero on L 1 . Since β 1 = β 2 by assumption, it is impossible for (2p 1 − 1)β 1 λ 1 + (2p 2 − 1)β 2 λ 2 to also be identically zero on L 1 . Thus, U cannot achieve the global minimum on all of L 1 . By contradiction, this proves that U is not a convex function.
Admission Prices and Wardrop Equilibria
We now consider the same queueing model, but generalized to include admission prices c 1 > c 2 > . . . > c N at queues 1, 2, . . . , N. Each customer seeks to join a queue that minimizes the sum of the admission price, which is common to all classes, and the expected delay cost, which is weighted by a class-specific sensitivity. In Section 2, we modeled the resulting interaction as a game, and wrote down the conditions for a routing matrix P to be a Wardrop equilibrium in (3). We shall now show that a Wardrop equilibrium has the same structure that we demonstrated for a social optimum in the previous section.
Theorem 2 Consider two customer classes i 1 < i 2 , so that β i1 > β i2 , and two queues j 1 < j 2 , so that c j1 > c j2 . There is no Wardrop equilibrium P W in which class i 1 uses queue j 2 while class i 2 simultaneously uses queue j 1 , i.e., p 
Re-arranging these inequalities, we get
Since c 1 > c 2 , the second inequality implies that D ⊓ ⊔ We have the following corollary, which is an analogue of Corollary 1. The proof is omitted as it is straightforward.
Corollary 2 Suppose P
W is a Wardrop equilibrium. There exist numbers
The main difference from Corollary 1 is that we do not guarantee that all routing probabilities are strictly positive inside these ranges. Whereas, in the welfare-optimizing setting, any unused queues were necessarily those with the largest delays, now either a large delay or a high admission price or a combination of the two could result in a queue not being used by any customer class.
A natural mechanism design problem suggested by the above results is whether we can set admission prices in queues in such a way that selfish users reacting to these prices would assign themselves to queues in the proportions required for optimizing social welfare. [15] proposed the use of a charge or levy to internalize the congestion externality in transport networks, thereby guiding the system to a social optimum. Such charges are known as Pigouvian taxes and they have been studied in several contexts including transportation networks [17, 18] . However, these have typically focused on managing demand or guiding route choice, whereas here we study their use to achieve service differentiation in a multi-class setting.
Let P * denote the routing matrix solving the social welfare optimization problem and γ * the corresponding vector of traffic flow rates at the different queues. Now, a marginal unit of traffic at queue n increases the delay of each customer at this queue by D ′ n (γ * n ). This imposes a cost of β m D ′ n (γ * n ) on each class m customer using this queue, of whom there are λ m p * mn per unit time. Thus, the total congestion externality caused by a marginal unit of traffic at queue n, which is the Pigouvian tax for this queue, is given by
We shall show that, if the admission price at each queue is set equal to the Pigouvian tax at that queue, then the optimal allocation P * is a Wardrop equilibrium.
Theorem 3 Let P * be a routing matrix solving the social welfare optimization problem. Assume that the resulting flows γ * are such that γ * n is in the interior of the domain of D n (·) for each queue, n. Let the admission prices c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N at queues 1, 2, . . . , N be set according to (8) . Then P * is a Wardrop equilibrium of the resulting game.
Proof. Since P * solves the constrained optimization problem in (2), the constraints on P are affine, and U is continuously differentiable at P * , it follows that P * must satisfy the KKT conditions: these state that there exist A ∈ R M×N and b ∈ R M such that
Here, a in is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint p in ≥ 0, and is zero if the constraint is slack, and b i is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
If class i uses queue n in the optimal allocation P * , then (9) implies that, for all m = 1, . . . , N , we have
Differentiating U (P ) defined in (2), we can rewrite this as
Substituting (8) in the above, we get
for all m = 1, . . . , N . This holds for every i and n such that class i uses queue n. Comparing this with (3), we see that this is exactly the condition for P * to be a Wardrop equilibrium. This completes the proof of the theorem.
⊓ ⊔
Numerical Example
In this section, we will consider a numerical example to illustrate the results of the preceding sections. We assume that there are five customer classes and five servers i.e. M = N = 5. Customers of Class i arrive according to a stationary Poisson process of rate λ i while Server j is an exponential server with service rate µ j . Thus the queues are M/M/1 and the mean delay at queue j is D j (γ j ) = The P * that minimizes U (P ) is obtained using the fmincon function in MATLAB and is as below. Observe that the servers are reordered in increasing order of the mean delays with Q i denoting the server with service rate µ i . We see that this P * satisfies Corollary 1.
Next, let the admission prices for queues 1, . . . , 5 be, respectively, 2.57, 1.53, 0.7, 0.42, and 0. The Wardrop equilibrium allocation at these prices will be Clearly, P W satisfies Corollary 2. Next, we calculate the Pigouvian admission prices, which turn out to be 3.28, 2.77, 2.194, 1.59, and 1.27. It can be verified that for these prices, the Wardrop equilibrium condition is satisfied by the social welfare maximizing allocation, P * .
Conclusion
We considered a very general model of multiple parallel queues serving a heterogeneous customer population, and studied the problem of routing customers to queues so as to maximize social welfare. We characterized certain structural properties of the welfare-optimizing allocation. Next, we considered selfish routing decisions made by individual customers and characterized the structure of Wardrop equilibria. We then showed that, if queues charge admission prices, and these are set equal to the congestion externalities at the optimal allocation, then the resulting Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. While the results we have presented are for a finite number of customer classes, they can easily be extended to a continuum of customer classes indexed by a delay sensitivity parameter β with a known distribution. Our results raise a number of questions for future research. Firstly, as mentioned in Section 3, the computational complexity of determining the optimal allocation is unknown, though we showed that the optimization problem is non-convex. Likewise, the computational complexity of determining Wardrop equilibria is also unknown.
A second question concerns the informational constraints on the model. We have assumed that the parameters λ i and β i are known, and available as input to determining the socially optimal allocation or setting admission prices. In practice, this information is unlikely to be available, but needs to be inferred from observation. If customer classes are known upon arrival, then the arrival rates λ can easily be measured, but eliciting β truthfully can still be a challenge. The problem is much harder if customers are heterogeneous but there are either no clearly defined classes, or that class membership is unobservable, as is often likely to be the case. In such a situation, is it still possible to set admission prices in such a way as to ensure that the Wardrop equilibrium either coincides with the welfare optimizing allocation, or approximates it to within some factor?
Finally, we have assumed that a benevolent mechanism designer sets admission prices to maximize social welfare; it is interesting to ask what happens if the admission prices are set by a revenue maximizing service provider. Further, in such a revenue maximizing scenario it would be interesting to see if competing service providers can sustain differentiated services.
Notes: Continuing with the assumptions of [8] , Littlechild [11] further obtains the admission fee that will induce the socially optimal arrival rate. Bradford [6] considers a multi-class muti-server model with classes having heterogeneous time value as well as heterogeneous value for obtaining service. The arriving customers are to be probabilistically routed to the servers to minimise a social utility. For such a system, Bradford obtains the adimission price to be charged per class i customer such that the induced Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the socially optiml allocation. Two main differences between our model and that of [6] are as follows. In [6] , a customer obtains a value for service depending on its class. A customer balks from the system if its cost for obtaining a service exceeds its valuation for such a service. We do not allow customers to balk in our model. Secondly, the Pigouvian prices that we obtain are not specific to any particular class of customers but are levied to any customer joining a particular queue in the system. [12] considers an identical model except that customers of different classes have the same time value and the different classes differ only in their arrival rates.
